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During World War II, 2710 Liberty ships were built in the United States across
18 ship yards. The rate of production of these ships was at a scale not previously
witnessed, reflecting a strategic marshaling of national assets critical to the
war effort. For the metallurgist, metallurgical engineer, or materials scientist,
these ships also struck commanding images regarding their catastrophic fail-
ures. The study of these failures led to increased understanding of brittle
fracture, fracture mechanics, and ductile-to-brittle transition temperatures.
The post-mortem studies of Liberty ships highlighted the importance of com-
position and microstructure in controlling the properties of steel in fracture-
critical applications. This study examines a rivet from the SS ‘‘John W. Brown’’,
which was assembled in Baltimore, Maryland, and launched in September
1942, The ‘‘John W. Brown’’ was restored between 1988 and 1991. Classical
metallurgical analysis of a rivet from the original 1942 vessel is compared with
modern rivets used during its restoration. The rivets provide an analogue to the
plate material used in these ships. A comparison of these materials is presented
along with a discussion of the importance of composition–microstructure–
property relationships that concomitantly evolved.
INTRODUCTION
A metallurgical study of material obtained from
the ‘‘John W. Brown’’ (see Fig. 1a and b), a U.S.
Liberty ship, provides an opportunity to reflect on
how these ships came to catalyze significant
national, social, and technical advances. The
incredibly rich story of these vessels is far more
than the common historical footnote that these were
‘the ships that broke’. While the technical work
presented in this article is motivated by a metal-
lurgical analysis of two rivets, it is important to
understand the other significant advances that were
made as a result of Liberty ship construction and
failures. Therefore, a historical retrospective is
provided prior to the metallurgical analysis, a pro-
logue on the construction and sailing of the Liberty
ships. In addition to the historical context, the
introduction includes descriptions of the previously
unknown phenomenon associated with notch sen-
sitivity, and the subsequent rapid efforts to under-
stand it, codifying it in ductile-to-brittle transition
temperatures (DBTT) and nil ductility transition
temperatures (NDTT), and recollections of the
importance that notable individuals played in the
scientific process.
Prologue: The Liberty Ships and the ‘‘John W.
Brown’’
In the twenty-first century, it is hard to imagine
the spectacularly complex and massive shipbuilding
and seamanship undertaken by the United States
during World War II. More than 6000 ships were
built from before 1941 to 1945, including 2710
emergency Liberty cargo ships. The peak point of
Liberty production was early 1943. Thousands of
workers flocked from small towns, big cities, and in
between to assemble every 441-foot, 58-foot-wide
ship using 250,000 individual parts.E. F. Imhoff is now retired from Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, MD, USA.
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The single shipyard assembling the most ships
was Bethlehem-Fairfield in Baltimore with 384
Liberty vessels. Bethlehem-Fairfield was the only
yard of the 18 where all shell plate seams, those
running fore and aft between plates, were riveted.
Some shipyards built Liberty ships that were all
welded and other yards used both rivets and weld-
ing. The vertical joints called butts were welded in
all Liberty ships.1
Following the first voyage in 1942, from 1943 to
1945, the ‘‘John W. Brown’’ sailed seven times with
war goods and troops mostly to the Mediterranean.
Following World War II, the ‘‘John W. Brown’’
became a non-sailing maritime high school for
seagoing young people in New York City from 1946
to 1982. From 1983 to 1988, the ‘‘John W. Brown’’
was anchored in the Defense Fleet in the James
River. The ‘‘John W. Brown’’ still sails today from
Baltimore as a historic Living History ship after
rescue by Maryland volunteers in 1988 from the
James River National Defense Reserve Fleet in
Virginia.
The Liberty ships were part of the American
merchant marine serving the fighting troops (some
became military ships). They carried the food,
weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and
fighting gear; everything needed to wage war.
Steamship companies operated them, civilians
served on them and U.S. Navy Armed Guardsmen
manned their guns. Not technically warships, they
sailed through warzones, in convoys, came under
attack, and saw action.
U-boats were sinking many Allied ships in the
early war years, but by February 1943, Liberty
tonnage had increased and finally passed the ton-
nage of ships sunk by the submarines. More and
more U-boats were being sunk and more Liberties
were built as the war continued.
All steaming Liberty ships are gone from the high
seas today save for the ‘‘John W. Brown’’ in Balti-
more and the S.S. ‘‘Jeremiah O’Brien’’ in San
Francisco. They sail with passengers on Living
History day cruises. The ‘‘Hellas Liberty’’, once the
SS ‘‘Arthur M. Huddell’’, is a stationary historical
Liberty in Greece. The ‘‘John W. Brown’’ sails with
the original Huddell rudder, one of many old parts
the ‘‘John W. Brown’’ acquired from discarded Lib-
erty ships with U.S. Maritime Commission
approval.
For those interested, some rich sources of infor-
mation on the Liberty ships are given in Refs. 1–6.
The Historical Story: Technology and People
Importantly, the selection of the original design
for the Liberty ship was based upon a pressing
national need to rapidly establish an emergency
cargo fleet of vessels that would be fast, reliable, and
cheap to build. In addition to moving significant
numbers of troops and supplies, a large number of
vessels were needed to counter the maritime losses
being faced by the Allied troops. To achieve these
objectives, an outdated but very reliable design (the
Ocean class) whose origins traced back more than
60 years (to the British Sunderland Tramp design,
1879) powered by 140-ton vertical triple expansion
steam engines (also obsolete) was adopted. These
decisions were made because it enabled more com-
panies to contribute to the industrial effort. Some
notable changes to the obsolete designs were made.
They were modified to increase the displacement
(i.e., cargo weight) to over 10,000 tons, conform to
assembly-line type practices, use oil-fired (instead of
coal) boilers, and, importantly, replacing many of
the rivets with welds. The resulting design was
officially known as the EC2–S–C1 for: EC = Emer-
gency Cargo; 2 = length class (between 400 and 450
feet in length at the waterline); S = Steam; and,
notably for getting the first design into the water
and indicating the maturity of the baseline design,
C1 = design 1. However, where the Liberty ships
were a very functional, reliable, and cheap vessel to
produce, they were also of an anticipated finite
lifetime of five years, and were perceived as
unattractive. Indeed, they were called ‘dreadful
looking’ by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and an ‘ugly duckling’ by Time magazine.7,8
Fig. 1. The SS ‘‘John W. Brown’’ (a) upon launching2 and (b)
underway in the Chesapeake Bay on a Living History cruise (E.F.
Imhoff).
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The Liberty ships are also strongly associated
with the need to increase participation of women in
the workforce. While women were increasingly
being employed in various other industries critical
to the war effort, it is notable that the National
Historic Park dedicated to the role of women during
World War II (Rosie the Riveter/World War II Home
Front National Historical Park) is in the shipyards
of Richmond, California; home to Henry J. Kaiser’s
Richmond Liberty shipyards. It is also in close
proximity, and commemorates the activities of, the
Richmond Ford Motor Company Assembly Plant,
which was one of only three tank depots in the
United States.9 In addition to the well-known ‘Rosie
the Riveter’, the role of women in the Liberty ship-
yards (see, for example, Fig. 2) also included ‘Wendy
the Welder’ based on Janet Doyle, a worker at the
same Richmond shipyards.10
In modern metallurgical history, these afore-
mentioned facts may not be known or appreciated,
given the other importance that these ships played
in the understanding of the performance of materi-
als. The metallurgists are more likely to associate
these ships with their catastrophic failures. Three of
the 2710 Liberty ships built literally ‘broke in half’,
very similar to the T2 tankers, including the SS
‘‘Schenectady’’ of photographic fame, as well as the
‘‘Pendleton’’ and ‘‘Fort Mercer’’, each which split in
two on the same day off Cape Cod (see Fig. 311). The
Liberty ship failures lead to the loss of 10 lives (all
10 in only 1 event). In addition, there were another
1500 cases of brittle fractures in ship hulls and
decks during World War II. Some suspicion fell
upon the untrained welders and the new welding
techniques that were being employed to keep pace
with the demands of the National war effort. The
welding of these ships was not the key factor to any
performance issues, as we now know. Welding
played a role only in three ways. Firstly, welding
created a more monolithic piece that allowed cracks
which, once initiated, could self-propagate carrying
a sharp notch at the crack tip. The monolithic pieces
also provided greater constraints that would lead to
larger stresses at concentrators. Secondly, welding
was typically performed in regions which already
contained a ‘geometric discontinuity’ (i.e., geometric
notch), placing the weld in intimate contact with the
initiating notch. Thirdly, occasionally, welds would
contain a defect that served as a stress concentrator.
It was most common that the defects would arise
from the welds associated with the bilge keels,
where a bulb bar was used to form the keel. The hull
plating would be welded to the bulb (a challenging
weld to be sure), and one where welding defects
(e.g., incomplete welding) was more prone to occur.2
One could argue that welding played one final role,
in that it reduced cost and allowed for a significant
population of steel in structural applications. The
proliferation of these structures, and the corre-
sponding large number of failures, allowed for the
DBTT to be identified as a statistically meaningful
problem to be addressed. Indeed, prior to these
ships, only one brittle fracture (the Hasselt Road
Bridge, Belgium, 1938) had led to a notable failure.
Thus, welding and the welders (e.g., Wendy the
Welder) received very unfair and unwarranted
suspicion. In reality, and as was understood later, it
was the grades of steel used (both composition and
microstructure) that contributed predominately to
these brittle failures.
Obviously, there was a problem. The Liberty
ships (and others, including the RMS ‘‘Titanic’’12,13)
were failing in a catastrophic and as-yet unknown
manner. When the Liberty ships were designed and
built, there was not an awareness of the DBTT or of
the NDTT. Only in 1943 did a correlation between
temperature and notch sensitivity begin to be
Fig. 2. An unidentified ‘‘Wendy the Welder’’ at the Bethlehem-Fair-
field Shipyard, likely butt welding the vertical joints from Ref. 2.
Original photo: Library of Congress (Arthur S. Siegel, photographer,
U.S. Farm Security Administration).
Fig. 3. The T2 tanker ‘‘Fort Mercer’’ off of Cape Cod on February 19,
1952 being circled by the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, ‘‘East-
wind’’.11
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understood, after the construction of Liberty ships
was well underway. In fact, according to a careful
review14 by Williams and Ellinger for the Ship
Structure Committee convened by the U.S. Secre-
tary of the Treasury and chaired by Ellis Reed-Hill,
the ‘‘specifications for steel for hull construction in
effect at the time of purchase’’ were based on the
tensile strength, yield point, and an unusual mea-
sure of elongation. Most of the plates that failed
with a brittle fracture would have passed the stan-
dards of the day, location-to-location variability for
the rimmed steel of the day notwithstanding. The
shipping community needed to understand, and
solve, the problem. Two notable efforts stand out to
address the nature of these brittle fractures.
Interestingly, the reader might recognize the last
name Reed-Hill. Ellis Reed-Hill was a Rear Admi-
ral, United States Coast Guard, and Chairman of
the Ship Structure Committee which reported the
work of Morgan L. Williams and George A. Ellinger
of the National Bureau of Standards in their report
‘‘Fractured Steel Plates Removed from Welded
Ships’’, covering work from 1942 to 1948. He was
later awarded the Legion of Merit. His son, Robert
E. Reed Hill, also served in the U.S. Coast Guard.
Upon retiring, he then went to the University of
Florida, where he was very active in research in
physical metallurgy, including writing the first
edition of Physical Metallurgy Principles, a seminal
physical metallurgy book for many students.15–18
Williams and Ellinger (the U.S. Effort)
The first is the aforementioned report by Williams
and Ellinger,14 which details the investigations of
not only the Liberty ships but of other vessels of the
day. The report details events during the winter of
1942–1943, when two cargo vessels located in the
North Atlantic, one tank vessel off the coast of New
York, and another tank vessel (the SS ‘‘Schenec-
tady’’, and similar tankers (shown in Fig. 3)) at a
dock in Oregon snapped completely in two following
their sea trials. At all three locations, water tem-
peratures averaged from 0C to 7C, with air
temperatures ranging from –2C to  5C. Over
the next decade, many other vessels experienced
less catastrophic material failure. By 1947,
approximately 60 U.S. ships (50% being Liberty
ships) required structural components (e.g., plates)
replacement due to fractures that occurred when
exposed to operating temperatures below 5C. In
an effort to better understand the problem, the
Naval Department Bureau of Ships, and then the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), received 83
samples from 48 of these 60 ships to test for mate-
rial properties, including the DBTT. Some impor-
tant clues were found using the v-notch Charpy test
on the residual material. For example, in general,
the cracks initiated in the plate material exhibited
the lowest energy absorbed during testing (i.e.,
brittle), propagated through plates exhibiting
intermediate energy absorption, and terminated in
plates exhibiting the highest energy absorption (i.e.,
least notch-sensitive). Once the data was plotted,
and the threshold of 20.3 J (15 ft-lbs in the original
units) was determined, only 8 of the 83 samples
tested had DBTTs at or below 7C, meaning that
90% of the specimens would have exhibited a brittle
failure (and with a lower impact energy) at or below
this temperature. Thus, any weak points within the
ships could easily become the initiating points for
brittle fractures under much more temperate water
and air temperatures than expected, because ser-
vice temperatures were below the nominal DBTT.
To exacerbate this problem, welded structures
allowed the cracks to propagate through multiple
plates. DBTTs for plates tested from the Liberty
Ships ranged from –4.4C to 66C, while averaging
around 24.8C.14
Constance Tipper (the U.K. Effort)
The other notable effort to understand what was
occurring in these materials was conducted by the
British Admiralty Ship Welding Committee, which
engaged Constance Tipper (see feature article in this
issue of JOM19) to lead the metallurgical investiga-
tion. Tipper was a trail-blazing woman who was the
first woman to take the Natural Sciences Tripos, in
1915, at the University of Cambridge. She then
launched a distinguished career as a metallurgist
and crystallographer, including conducting some of
the earliest investigations of fracture surfaces using
scanning electron microscopy, and making signifi-
cant contributions in the area of fracture mechan-
ics.20,21 The efforts of the two committees were
closely aligned, sharing knowledge freely. Indeed,
Tipper worked for periods of time in the Mechanics
Division at the Naval Research Laboratory, invited
by G.R. Irwin. While the efforts of Williams and
Ellinger were seminal and encyclopedic, Tipper was
able to fully unravel the story of brittle fracture.22
She developed systematic approaches to dealing
with the data, and included careful analysis of both
microstructure and composition, pulling together
both her own data and the work of others in the field
at the time. For example, she was able to show that,
as opposed to simply looking at the Mn:C ratio
(viewed as important), it was also necessary to
consider the microstructure. Considering only com-
position was insufficient. For example, a poor
microstructure (coarse grains, stress concentrators)
may overcome the expected benefits of a ‘good’ Mn:C
heat, resulting in a plate that exhibits inferior notch
sensitivity. In addition, she quantified preferential
cleavage planes in the a-ferrite (see Fig. 4), allowing
for a simultaneous understanding of the roles of
both fracture mechanics and crystal structure on
this problem. Without a doubt, the rapid collection
of large quantities of information by the U.S. and
British governments, and the careful and method-
ological investigations by many, including Tipper,
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enabled the complex problem of notch-sensitive
materials to be significantly understood in a very
short period of time.
The Remaining Metallurgical Background
In the early 1950s, techniques for measuring
notch sensitivity matured, especially for welded
ship applications. Ship building had moved from
riveted to welded structures, yet, as noted above,
there were certain ‘triggers’ from welds (e.g., a pre-
existing geometric crack, and defects).23 In addition,
weld processing introduced a new material with its
own DBTT, as well as modifying (e.g., coarsening)
the grain structures and the microstructure. Each
alteration potentially led to susceptibility to this
newly found phenomenon. The U.S. Navy needed to
develop a better method to test welded structures
and guarantee fracture-safe welded plates. Lever-
aging the knowledge gained in large part to the
materials failures associated with many ships in
World War II (including the Liberty Ships), the
drop-weight test was developed to determine the
transition temperature for welded steel. In order to
mimic welding conditions in the steel, a small crack-
starter bead is welded to the sample with a notch or
crack in the center of the bead. The sample is then
heated or cooled to a specific testing temperature.
During the test, a guided free-falling weight
impacts the bead on the sample. The sample is
considered broken when the weld bead cracks, and
the cracking reaches the sample surface.24 After a
sample breaks, the testing temperature is increased
by 5.6C, and the test is repeated until two consec-
utive samples do not break. For the drop-weight
test, the lowest temperature at which two samples
do not break is referred to as the NDTT. Following
the Williams and Ellinger report and adopting this
new method, the metallurgy division of the Naval
Research Laboratory used the drop-weight test and
found a NDTT of approximately 10C for a WWII
plate sample available from previous studies. This
specific ship, a T-2 tanker, broke in two off the coast
of Boston, Massachusetts, while the air temperature
was 1.5C, well below the discovered NDTT.25
Importantly, this occurrence confirmed that the
material was the source of failure, and not welding
by alleged untrained workers.
The Bethlehem Steel Plant produced over 1 mil-
lion tons of steel for ships assembled at the Beth-
lehem-Fairfield shipyard in Baltimore.26 Most, if
not all, of that steel was produced using the open-
hearth process.27 At that time, this process was the
most effective method of producing good quality
steel. Improved quality control was identified as a
national need due to irregularities found in steel
during the expansion of the railways.28 As a result,
organizations such as the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) were founded to
establish quality control standards through pre-
scribed testing procedures. Prior to the Liberty
ships, World War I provided an unprecedented
challenge for the commercial steel industry to
transform, producing the steel needed for tanks and
ships. During this time, an extensive standards-
making process came about due to this demand,
which provided the framework for the revitalized
steel production necessary for World War II. The
standards successfully maintained the overarching
goal for quality control throughout the war. Fur-
ther, examining grades within a specified standard
gives a thorough understanding of the material at
hand. As noted previously, the standards that were
in place were for static tensile properties, such as
yield strength, ultimate tensile strength, and elon-
gation to failure. The Liberty ships and other ves-
sels clearly identified the need to consider
additional properties, such as notch sensitivity,
DBTT, and NDTT. Over the next decades, tech-
nologies evolved (i.e., the basic oxygen furnace) and
practices changed. The standards responded soon
after abandoning the open-hearth process alto-
gether, allowing structural steel to be made from
only basic oxygen or electric-arc processes.29
The Liberty Ship Rivets
While many will first recall that the majority of
the Liberty ships used welding to join most of the
structure (except for those, including the ‘‘John W.
Brown’’, built at the Bethlehem–Fairfield shipyard
in Baltimore), rivets were used in the ship structure
and played key roles in the solution to the brittle
cracking problems.2 In fact, it was a riveting strat-
egy that was adopted which allowed these ships to
continue to operate with a remarkable record of
success even before the metallurgy of the problem
was fully understood. Riveted seams were installed
Fig. 4. Strategy proposed by Dr. C. Tipper to first understand
mechanisms of the DBTT involving careful measurements of the ‘‘%
Crystallinity’’, which would correlate with brittle cleavage as opposed
to ductile fracture.22
Revisiting (Some of) the Lasting Impacts of the Liberty Ships via a Metallurgical Analysis
of Rivets from the SS ‘‘John W. Brown’’
2969
on the Liberty ships to act as crack arrestors.
According to Capt. Walter Jaffee,2 during the
restoration of the ‘‘John W. Brown’’, 15,000 rivets
(mainly from the underwater portions of the hull)
were replaced.
The Liberty ship rivets which are the subject of
this study not only speak to this history but provide
an opportunity to look at contemporary analogues to
the plate material which is largely unavailable for
modern studies. By combining the interpretations of
the previous studies detailed above with modern
metallographic analysis, it is possible to draw con-
nections between the microstructure and perfor-
mance of the plate steel used in Liberty ships, and
how processing improvements have resulted in
superior grades of steel. Further, it is possible to
understand the role of the design of the joints in
their failures. The technical details which follow
focus on the metallurgy of two rivets: one original to
the Liberty ship SS ‘‘John W. Brown’’, and an
unused, modern replacement rivet.
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
The two rivets, a 1942 original extracted from the
Liberty ship SS ‘‘John W. Brown’’ during its
restoration and an unused modern replacement
were designated as the Original Rivet (OR) and New
Rivet (NR) samples. Both samples were sectioned
for grinding. For all polishing steps, an isopropyl
alcohol solution was used as a lubricant/cleaning
solution to mitigate corrosion. Coarse polishing
began with 80-grit wet/dry silicon carbide abrasive
paper and progressed to an 800-grit step. Subse-
quently, the samples were subjected to fine polish-
ing using a series of felt-pads and diamond-
suspension grits, starting with 9-lm diamond-sus-
pension and ending with a 0.05-lm suspension.
Between polishing steps, the material was cleaned
in an ultra-sonic bath with isopropyl alcohol. Fol-
lowing specimen preparation, the material was
analyzed using a variety of techniques to charac-
terize the composition and microstructure. Luvak
laboratories analyzed the chemical composition of
both rivets using combustion infrared detection and
direct current plasma emission spectroscopy
(DCPES). In addition, energy dispersive spec-
troscopy (EDS) was used to determine the compo-
sition of specific microstructural features when the
specimens were being analyzed in the scanning
electron microscope (SEM). An FEI Quanta SEM
was also used to image the specimen microstruc-
ture. The results are presented below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Composition
Based on the available literature, original Liberty
ship rivets did not have a specified composition.
Generally, low carbon steels were chosen to satisfy a
given mechanical property. This is not to say that
the role of composition on some properties was not
understood, rather that the variability in suppliers
of the steel needed for this tremendous National
effort, as well as the location-to-location composi-
tional variability in heat, made the mechanical
specification a more appropriate standard at the
time. Given that the specified grade of rivets could
not be directly determined from technical reports,
the modern standards of similar parts are given.
The standard for carbon structural steel is ASTM
A36 (introduced in 1960) and would correspond to
the plate material used in the hulls of the Liberty
ships, while modern steel rivets are subject to the
standard A502 (grade 1). Portions of these chemical
standards are given in Table I. It should be noted
that the compositions recorded from the Williams
and Ellinger report are average values across many
steel plates originating from different ships, differ-
ent plate sources, and different thicknesses. Thus, it
is not surprising that the compositions of Liberty
ship plates varied wildly. Consequently, the stan-
dard deviations are not reported and provide little
interpretable information.
Comparing the composition of the original rivet
with the average compositions of the plates studied
by Williams and Ellinger shows minor differences.
The carbon content of the original rivet lies outside
the scatter of measurements (0.17–0.37) made on
recovered plates by Williams and Ellinger, but not
significantly. The carbon content may appear to be
slightly lower due to differences in the analytical
techniques over the past 70 years, or may be
slightly lower to decrease the flow stress during the
upsetting of the rivet during ship-building. Further,
every other element lies within the measurements
made by Williams and Ellinger. Thus, it is reason-
able to conclude that the original rivet and plate are
likely of approximately the same grade of steel and
made by the same process (the open-hearth fur-
nace). Consequently, these rivets provide a steel
analogue to the original plate, as that steel is largely
not available for modern studies.
The Mn:C ratio is presented in Table I. Williams
and Ellinger observed that the ratio of these two
elements has a strong correlation with the notch
sensitivity of the steels. This is not surprising as
increasing carbon content decreases the energy
required to fracture in a v-notch Charpy test and
increases the DBTT.14,22 Conversely, Mn has the
opposite effect.14,22 However, Williams and Ellin-
ger also noted that the ratio, taken by itself, would
have been an insufficient metric to fully under-
stand the problem. Based upon the Williams and
Ellinger report, the composition of the rivets cor-
responds to a 20.3 J impact threshold temperature
of 5C to 20C. Thus, the rivets would have
exhibited the same brittle failure as the plates in
the temperature conditions experienced by the
Liberty ships. This underscores the fact that the
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benefits of the rivets lay in the design of the joint.
The welded structure allowed the cracks to prop-
agate, whereas a riveted structure prevented crack
propagation.
The differences in the composition of the original
and modern rivets are also illuminating. While both
rivets are within the allowables of A502 (grade 1),
they vary significantly in their compositions. For
example, the new rivet contains nearly five times
more silicon, and has significantly increased Mn:C
and Mn:S ratios. From a strict assessment of
chemistry only, it would be difficult to conclude
which rivet exhibited a better DBTT, as Si and Mn
exhibit opposite effects. It is necessary to under-
stand the microstructure of these steels to better
understand the likely effect of the individual ele-
ments. What follows is an assessment of the pres-
ence of inclusions which is presented relative to
chemical composition, and can impact the perfor-
mance through interstitial solute gettering. Addi-
tional details, such as the partitioning of S, P, and C
in the a-ferrite, which is known to play a role in
notch sensitivity, was not conducted as part of this
study.
Microstructure
The microstructure of both rivets (the available
analogue to the plate) consisted primarily of a-fer-
rite and various types of inclusions. The size of an
a-ferrite region was determined30 to be roughly
equivalent (OR = 21 lm, NR = 25 lm), indicating
that the grain size would exhibit a negligible dif-
ference in the properties of these two rivets.22 The
bulk of this microstructural analysis focuses on the
observed inclusions, which are markedly different
when comparing the original and modern rivets.
These differences can be directly related to the
improvements in steel processing that occurred in
the decades following the Liberty ships. Inclusions
found in steels can be one of five types: sulfides,
oxides, silicates, nitrides, and phosphides.31 The
first three (i.e., sulfides, oxides, and silicates) were
observed in both the original and modern rivets,
though in different distributions and compositions.
Importantly, such analysis was not feasible in the
previous seminal works by either Williams and
Ellinger or Tipper. While inclusions were noted
(especially by Tipper), the precise compositional
nature of the inclusions were not.
Sulfides
The majority of the inclusions that were observed
in the original rivet were manganese sulfide inclu-
sions, the most common inclusion found in steel.32 It
is well known that the presence of these inclusions
aids in overcoming the negative effects of iron oxi-
des and iron sulfides27 which decreases ductility
and reduces strength, respectively. The addition of
manganese to liquid steel results in the precipita-
tion of manganese oxide and manganese sulfide
which are more thermodynamically stable than iron
oxide and iron sulfide. Further, these manganese
inclusions are relatively harmless and do not
weaken the material. Often, the manganese-to-sul-
fur ratio is calculated when studying these inclu-
sions. A higher Mn:S ratio is preferred because this
would reduce or eliminate any iron sulfide particles.
The modern rivet has a higher Mn:S ratio (22.76)
compared to both the original rivet (11.43) and the
plate (12.7), indicating a reduction in iron sulfide
and, consequently, a higher strength.
Manganese sulfide inclusions can be categorized
by their morphology, which is related to the con-
centration of aluminum in the steel. Type I MnS
inclusions are equiaxed (i.e., globular) and are typ-
ically found in steels with high oxygen content and
very low aluminum content. Type II MnS inclusions
are better described as films or envelopes, and are in
steels (or regions in segregated steels) that contain
small amounts of aluminum. Type III MnS
Table I. Comparison of the Liberty ship deck materials, original rivets, and modern replacement rivet, with
reference to modern standards of steel grades
A502 (Grade 1)
(wt.%)
A36
(wt.%)
Plate
(wt.%)14
Original rivet
(wt.%)
New rivet
(wt.%)
OR versus
NR % diff.
C 0.11–0.27 0.29 0.25 0.160 0.154 4
Mn 0.27–0.93 0.80–1.2 0.42 0.480 0.660 +38
P <0.07 <0.04 0.015 0.008 0.013 +63
S <0.058 <0.05 0.033 0.042 0.029 31
Si … 0.15–0.4 0.035 0.040 0.190 +375
Ni … … 0.044 0.057 0.093 +63
Cr … … 0.036 0.046 0.093 +102
Mn:S ratio >4.66 >16 12.7 11.43 22.76 +100
Mn:C ratio >1.0 >2.75 1.68 3.0 4.28
 The reported Mn:C ratio is given here as a ratio of the average values. Williams and Ellinger took the Mn:C ratio for every sheet, and
then calculated the average of the ratio, which is 1.74. Significant differences in OR versus NR are shown in bold
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inclusions appear as faceted octahedral precipitates
and are found in steels with an excess amount of
aluminum.32 The MnS inclusions in both rivets are
predominately type I, which begin as equiaxed
structures and become elongated due to forming
operations. These MnS inclusions are soft and
deformable at low temperatures.33 The backscat-
tered scanning electron micrograph presented in
Fig. 5a and the corresponding EDS maps shown in
Fig. 5b–g show one of the type I MnS precipitates in
the original rivet. The inclusion appears to have
nucleated from a smaller oxide inclusion containing
aluminum, silicon, manganese, and oxygen accord-
ing to EDS mapping (see Fig. 5e–g).
Oxides
While potentially having adverse effects on the
mechanical properties,27 the presence of oxides
represents an engineering tradeoff. Free oxygen can
react with carbon to form CO and CO2 during pro-
cessing, resulting in gas porosity and/or a reduced
carbon content in the steel. Thus, selected elements
are added to the steel to form thermodynamically
stable oxides.34 Aluminum is a primary deoxidizer
while silicon and manganese play lesser roles.
The volume fraction, size, distribution, composi-
tion, and morphology of the inclusions are the most
significant factors which affect the mechanical
properties35 of the steel. These microstructural
features are influenced by processing and the
attending thermodynamic reactions.27 For example,
longer ladle holding times result in the formation of
more inclusions, and these inclusions float to the top
due to their lower densities and lead to higher vol-
ume fractions of inclusions in the upper regions of
the deoxidized ingots.32 Generally, if the steel is
processed poorly, oxide inclusions can become brit-
tle stress concentrators, and are detrimental to the
mechanical properties.35 Further, the scale of the
oxide inclusions will be related to the scale of any
plasticity-induced discontinuity (i.e., delamination,
particle cracking). The larger the particle, the
poorer the ductility and toughness. The scale of the
oxide inclusion has a very small influence on the
DBTT itself, but does have an effect on the upper
shelf energy.36
Silicates
As noted above, silicon can act as a deoxidizer,
and can react not only with oxygen but also with
other deoxidizing elements (including Mn) to form
more complex silicate inclusions. The presence of
these inclusions makes the material easier to cast,
although they may also coarsen the grains. As noted
previously, the grain size of both steels are
approximately equivalent. Specific processing con-
ditions have reportedly led to manganese oxides
reducing silicon, forming manganese silicates,32 as
appears to be the case in Fig. 6.
SEM imaging combined with EDS spot scans and
EDS mapping revealed several varieties of oxide
inclusions. Both rivets showed randomly distributed
aluminum oxide inclusions throughout the mate-
rial. Both rivets also exhibit sulfide formation
regardless of oxide nucleation sites. Lastly, both
rivets had spherical oxides that indicate a high
oxygen activity. However, as noted above, there was
an observable increase in the prevalence of man-
ganese aluminum silicate inclusions in the new
rivet. These manganese aluminum silicates were
smaller, and are known to be more deformable than
other oxide inclusions.33 For the sake of complete-
ness, it is noted that x-ray diffraction (XRD) was
also conducted, but there were no significant oxide
peaks to determine the volume fraction of the
inclusions.
Fig. 5. Manganese sulfide inclusion with a nucleation site. (a) Back-scattered electron, (b) Fe, (c) Mn, (d) S, (e) Al, (f) O, (g) Si.
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Effect on DBTT
Without question, the composition of steel affects
the DBTT. The composition of the steel in the orig-
inal rivet closely approximates the steel in the plate,
and thus likely would have suffered similarly. Thus,
the difference in design, that is, the difference
between a monolithic welded structure compared to
a riveted structure, is clear. The inferior DBTT of
the steel was exposed by the welded structures, but
not created by the welded structures. In addition, as
pointed out by Dr. Tipper, the composition is an
insufficient metric to understand the phenomenon.
For example, the same elements that form inclu-
sions (i.e., manganese and silicon) affect the DBTT,
but more strongly affect the DBTT when in solution
and less strongly when in inclusions. When 1 wt.%
of manganese is added, the 20.3 J transition tem-
perature is found to decrease by 55.6C, and when
1 wt.% of silicon is added, the transition tempera-
ture increases by 69.4C. According to the compo-
sitions measured in this work, considering only
manganese, the new rivet would have a lower
DBTT. However, considering only silicon, theoreti-
cally the original rivet would have a lower DBTT.37
However, as is also clear from the characterization
conducted here, the increased silicon content (and
the advances in steel making) have a profound
impact on the inclusions present in the microstruc-
ture., as similar compositions can exhibit different
microstructures and inclusions.
Specifically, the aluminum oxide inclusions are
readily observed in the original rivet (see Figs. 5
and 7). Most of the oxides in the original material
Fig. 6. Silicate and sulfide inclusion in the new rivet. (a) Back-scattered electron, (b) Fe, (c) Mn, (d) S, (e) Al, (f) O, (g) Si.
Fig. 7. Aluminum oxide inclusion acting as a nucleation site for MnS in the old rivet. (a) Back-scattered electron, (b) Fe, (c) Mn, (d) S, (e) Al, (f) O,
(g) Si.
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were spherical/equiaxed aluminum oxides observed
to be in intimate contact with the MnS particles,
most likely having served as initiation sites. The
Al2O3 particles in the original material are fairly
coarse (5 lm), and coarser than the silicides and
SiO2-MnO particles that are observed in the modern
rivet (1–2 lm; see Fig. 6). All oxides observed in
the modern rivet contained some level of silicon.
Further, no oxide was associated with the MnS
particles in the modern rivets. The SiO2-MnO par-
ticles were more elongated and aligned to the rolling
direction.
These subtle differences are important, and will
impact the expected properties of the two materials
as both plate analogues and as rivets. With respect
to the mechanical properties, the Al2O3 particles are
generally not deformable at any temperature. Thus,
their direct contact with the MnS particles would
likely reduce the upper shelf energy and possibly
promote internal cracks in the as-received materi-
als. This is due to the large differences in the plas-
ticity of the MnS and Al2O3 particles. Further, the
SiO2-MnO particles of the modern rivet are more
deformable than the Al2O3.
33
Thus, everything else being equal, the larger and
less deformable oxides in the original material in
intimate contact with the MnS would have resulted
in poorer properties (lower toughness, lower shelf
energy) than the smaller and more deformable oxi-
des which are somewhat removed from the MnS in
the modern material. From the perspective of ther-
modynamics, the morphology of the aluminum oxi-
des is directly related to the relative activities of
oxygen and aluminum. When the activity of oxygen
is high, the aluminum oxide inclusions tend to form
spheres. Conversely, when the activities of alu-
minum and oxygen are equivalent and at interme-
diate levels, the inclusions tend to form more
elongated dendritic-like structures. It is therefore
possible to conclude that the activity of the oxygen
was much higher for the original rivets, and that
they had more time to coarsen during the
processing.
CONCLUSION
This research has presented an opportunity to
reflect upon the Liberty ships, the pivotal role they
played in U.S. history, and the significant impact
that they had on the understanding of physical
metallurgy. Without the large number of vessels
and the significant investment of critical reviews
and intellectual capital to the problem by two gov-
ernments, the ductile-to-brittle transition might
have remained ignored or poorly understood. Indi-
viduals on both sides of the Atlantic played signifi-
cant (and synergistic) roles in understanding the
problem, especially Dr. Constance Tipper. However,
while these vessels played important roles, much of
the story has been forgotten.
The problem of hull cracks was a complex problem
associated with the steel, naturally occurring weld
defects, and the absence of seams where the cracks
could arrest. They were not the result of inferior
welders (e.g., Wendy the Welder), as was originally
suggested. The solution to the cracking was to
incorporate riveted structures. The steel of the rivet
studied here is a reasonable analogue to the plate
material, and would have suffered similarly poor
properties. Yet, the design of riveted structures,
even with the rivets that were used to ‘‘fix’’ the
Liberty ships, was more accommodating of the
inferior steel. It is evident from a comparison
between the two rivets that the size, chemistry, and
distribution of the precipitates is profoundly differ-
ent. Specifically, in the original rivet—and by
extension the original sheet—the adjoining Al2O3/
MnS inclusion clusters resulted in an undeformable
particle immediately adjacent to a deformable par-
ticle, a characteristic which would have invariably
resulted in microcracks due to the mismatch in
plastic strain accommodation. Conversely, the
modern steel contains more deformable oxides
which are disassociated from the MnS particles, and
consequently behave more as dispersions for
strengthening. The composition of the modern grade
reflects the knowledge gained following the discov-
ery of the DBTT, in that the Mn content has been
increased to improve the DBTT, while the increase
in Si has been shown to result in the formation of
more complex oxides and silicates as the result of
the deoxidation steps in the steel making process.
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